Studies of criminal-court dispositions have traditionally aggregated courts along political and geographic boundaries. This article suggests that courts should be analyzed individually, even within the same jurisdiction, as a means of increasing the explanatory capacity of the variables involved. Further, it is contended that intercourt differences are a result of organizational infiuences operating within each court.
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one of the most important sarcastically entitled book Criminal Senof which was the jurist's penal philosophy tences (Frankel. 1972 (Frankel. , 1973 . A second method of gathering data involved direct observation of the courts in action. The closed nature of the court system-the attempt to hide actions from outsiders-presents problems of data analysis on at least three levels. On one level, much of the court's important work takes place apart from public view, so that interested observers see only the end product. A court clerk in Hartford said, "We do more in the back room than we do in the court. That's where all the plea bargaining takes place."' On a second level, the attitude of system officials is that their work, by right, should be secret. The same clerk said one had to ask his permission to sit and take notes in open court. On a third level, there is a legal obstacle. The Connecticut General Assembly has enacted an erasure law that disallows examination of a defendant's record if he or she has been acquitted or no1 pressed.
MARC G. GERTZ md ALBERT C PRICE
Because of these three problem areas, certain seemingly key variables and cases were not collectible. Different pleas and the number and kinds of continuances are kept only in the court clerk's files. As a result of the control the clerk exercises. it is impossible to study the effect, for example, of increasing the number of continuances on the dispositional process (Banfield and Anderson, 1968) . Also, the law precludes studying both acquitted and convicted defendants.
ANALYSIS
In the initial stages, the analysis of sources of intercourt sentencing variation was grounded in the concepts and methodologies suggested in the literature discussed above. A relatively large number of variables were examined to determine the extent to which they influence the severity of disposition in Connecticut's superior courts. The independent variables were reduced through a number of stepwise-regression procedures that deleted variables with little explanatory strength. The list of empirical indicators included standard information, such as offense charged; condition of victim; victim knew offender; premises of offense; age, sex, prior record, employment status, education, race, and mental status of defendant; amount of bond; offender's story; time between arrest and disposition; number of eyewitnesses available." A severityof-disposition-interval-level scale was the dependent variable in this analysis.' Problems of multicollinearity and autocorrelation were explored, and when two variables had a highly significant relationship, one was deleted.
Initially. the data were aggregated for all five courts, and the explanatory power of the variables that we employed was extremely limited.5 When the data were disaggregated, through the use of physical controls for court locations, an interesting set of findings emerged. When analyzed on a court-by-court basis, the explanatory capacity of the variables improved markedly. This indicates that lumping the state's courts together may tend to mask the significance of the relationships between independent and dependent variables. The conclusion here is that the most appropriate method for analyzing variations between courts is to examine each court individually. The reason for this conclusion is that statistical control tends to obscure variation by using a mathematical averaging process that shows equal variations in opposite directions as having no influence. The ultimate impact of this process was to delete most of the.variables, because very few were important to a majority of the courts, and aggregation caused the courts to be treated as a single unit. For example, undercover agents used was a very important variable in This perspective does not diminish the principal finding of Table  1 , because organizational influences vary from court to court. Our interpretation is speculative at this stage. but would certainly ht nicely with the "crimecontrol" model discussed by Packer (1980) . From a crime-control perspective. the bureaucratic nature of the criminal-justice system is the dominant force in the processing of criminals in the United States. Our finding that the organizational needs of the system influence the severity of sentences in individual courts fits nicely into a crimecontrol model.
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This paper has attempted to till a gap that exists in the literature discussing the dispositional processes of criminal courts. Specifically, we examined sentencing severity in five Connecticut superior courts. At first, we were guided by the standard theoretical structure of the discipline. which stresses statewide aggregation of courts. This process produced results that were not important and did not help to explain variation in sentencing.
However, when the disposi-tional data were disaggregated, through physical control for individual courts, the results were significant. In essence, we found that while the state courts could not be explained as a group, they could be articulated very well on the basis of individual court locations.
The conclusion is that the superior courts are sufficiently diverse that it clouds our understanding to speak of them as a single, aggregate unit. Further, we found that the variables that had the most impact in the most settings were related to the organizational needs of the criminaljustice system. This research suggests two things. First and foremost, we must begin to come to grips with the problem of the aggregation of criminal courts by states or large metropolitan areas. Table 1 demonstrates, at a minimum, that there is sufficient reason to pursue research on sentencing criteria on a court-bycourt basis. This has not been done in the past, and our understanding of court processes has suffered correspondingly.
Second, and more tentatively.
this research suggests that the disposition of criminal cases may be related to the organizational needs of the criminal-justice system. This line of inquiry should also be pursued on a court-by-court basis. as the organizational needs of the system appear to be location specific.
Finally. this study has important implications for the study of criminal-justice reform and. more specifically, sentencing reform. If courts within the same state are indeed somewhat unique, then doesn't it follow that remedies for disparity in sentencing should also be related to particular courts? This conclusion implies that the type of sentencing reform suggested by Nagel (1983) . whereby states alter their criminal codes to adopt the average sentences meted out in the past, is doomed to failure. because the averages are distorted by the aggregation problem we have described.
This research demonstrates that one of the most salient features of intrastate sentencing variation is the individual flavor of the particular court organizations themselves.
Therefore. we suggest that serious considerations of sentencing reform be premised upon an adequate understanding of the criteria that have influenced sentencing in the past. Until we stop grouping together courts, even within the same political jurisdiction, as though they were the same, an adequate understanding of the courts will be lacking. ' A complete examination of our variable list and code hook exceeds the space availability of this paper.
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